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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Volume 18 1983 Number 3
TH1E "URBAN SEVERANCE TAX": SOME
QUESTIONS AS TO APPORTIONMENT
Sheppard F. Miers, Jr.*
The dramatic rise in energy resource values in the last decade has
been paralleled by the heightening importance of state and local taxes
on the extraction and production of those resources. Lawmakers in
both producing and consuming states are pragmatically seeking to ap-
ply a variety of tax measures to this expanded revenue base. Political
pressure to direct the impact of those taxes to producers and away from
consumers has helped shape the form of many of the taxes proposed
and enacted.
The result of these energy tax laws and proposals has been euphe-
mistically described as an economic or tax "civil war" between western
and southern producing states, and midwestern and eastern consuming
states.' Those engaged in oil and gas extraction, production, and sale
have been caught in the middle of the levies of the protagonists and
have become a convenient target of the taxing schemes involved. The
recent evolution and refinement of constitutional standards governing
state taxation has resulted, in large measure, from the effort of states to
expand and focus their taxing authority to include more of the coun-
* Associate, Huffman, Arrington, Kihle, Gaberino & Dunn, Tulsa, Oklahoma; B.A., 1963,
University of Oklahoma; J.D., 1966, University of Oklahoma; LL.M., 1979, Southern Methodist
University.
1. Bus. WK., May 12, 1980, at 91; Coates, A New Civil War Looms Over State Taxes on
NaturalResources, Wash. Post, Aug. 19, 1981, § I, at 7, col. 1.
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try's energy revenue base and the activities of corporate taxpayers gen-
erating it.
The Supreme Court's judicial formulation of a broad and more
uniform set of principles to govern application of constitutional limita-
tions on state taxation of interstate commerce has coincided with oil
price increases. At the same time, inflationary pressures have necessi-
tated a marked increase in revenue raising measures by states.2
The effect of the recent development and application of those prin-
ciples has been to clarify, make more consistent, and generally expand
the taxing authority of the states with respect to interstate commerce.
This restatement of the governing constitutional provisions has brought
several express changes in the reach and propriety of taxes affecting
mineral production and the income therefrom. Implicit in the new ap-
proach of the Court are other possible changes in constitutional appli-
cation. They may be of great significance to oil and gas producers
engaged in interstate transactions who are regarded as taxpayers with
economic capacity to furnish a large amount of additional tax revenues
to consuming, but nonproducing, states.
A catchy description of the State of New York's version of a tax3
intended to levy on the increased energy values is an "urban severance
tax" payable by oil and gas producers.4 That label was probably not
offered as a technical abstract of the law. It nevertheless elicits some
meaningful interpretive questions for companies whose operating costs
include new tax burdens from multistate efforts to derive added reve-
nue from taxes directed at oil and gas production activities.
The resolution of taxpayer challenges to the New York tax pend-
ing at this writing, which are based on the asserted conflict of the tax's
price control provisions with federal regulatory authority5 and the com-
merce clause,6 could render such questions moot as to that tax's appli-
cation.7 Nevertheless, the tax seems worthy of analysis from the
perspective of the questions considered in this Article, due to the expi-
2. N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1981, at B12, col. 1.
3. N.Y. TAX LAW § 182 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
4. Wash. Post, Aug. 19, 1981, § I, at 7, col. 1.
5. Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760h (1976 & Supp. V
1981).
6. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, dl. 3.
7. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Tully, 499 F. Supp. 888 (N.D.N.Y. 1980), appeal dirmissed and stay of
enforcement continued, 639 F.2d 912 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967, aJ'd, 653 F.2d 497
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981), vacatedandremandedper cur/am, 455 U.S. 245, remandedforfurher
proceedings, 689 F.2d 186 (Temp. Emer. CL App. 1982); see also Shell Oil Co. v. New York State
Tax Comm'n, 110 Misc. 2d 71, 441 N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), mod#fed, 111 Misc. 2d 460,444
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ration of the federal authority underlying the taxpayer challenge 8 and
the particular relationship of the form of the tax to the interstate energy
production and distribution pattern of operations subjected to it. The
issue of natural resource wealth sharing through taxation by producing
and consuming states is brought more sharply into focus by the form of
the tax. As a practical matter, it may represent a form of extraterrito-
rial severance or production tax, because it bears primarily upon tax-
payers producing oil and gas in the other states and selling refined
products in the taxing jurisdiction.
Among the interpretive questions suggested are: (1) If a nonpro-
ducing state's special oil company tax does effectively levy upon gross
receipts associated with the activity of extraction, can apportionment in
the form acceptable as an income tax operate to avoid multiple taxa-
tion, particularly where the producing state's production or severance
tax is imposed on the same activity or privilege, and (2) whether the
Supreme Court's conclusions on state income taxation of the unitary
business of an integrated oil company still leaves potential for chal-
lenge of special gross receipts taxes, or new applications of existing
laws, of nonproducing states seeking to tap the gross revenues of oil
and gas producers beginning at the wellhead.
The discussion in this Article attempts to explore these questions
in light of some recent decisions addressing state taxation of interstate
operations involving extractive industries. Departure from the ration-
ale of the historical application of constitutional standards to extractive
operations is also considered with respect to the application of tax
measures on natural resource activities and revenues by consuming
states as exemplified by the New York form of oil company tax.
A brief restatement of the fundamental standards which must now
be met by any state tax on revenues or activities which involve inter-
state commerce is appropriate. Those standards were spelled out by
the Supreme Court in the 1977 decision of Complete Auto Transit, Inc.
v. Brady.' The Court's statement in that case signaled a purposeful
and definitive break from the formalism of prior authority and a recon-
firmation of judicial preference for a "practical" approach in applica-
tion of constitutional limitations of state taxation. A state tax will
N.Y.S.2d 460 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981), modified, Nos. 43145, 43362 (N.Y. App. Div. Jan. 6, 1983)
(holding that anti-passthrough provisions of law discriminate against interstate commerce).
8. The Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act expired on September 30, 1981. 15 U.S.C.
§ 760g (1976); see Mobil v. Tully, 653 F.2d at 500.
9. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
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survive a challenge based upon the commerce clause under the test
enunciated in Complete Auto if the tax (1) has substantial nexus with
the state, (2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not discriminate against in-
terstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the services provided by
the state.10
I. COMMONWEALTH/EXXONr-UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN THE STATE
ENERGY TAX SPECTRUM.?
Since being set out in 1977, the Complete Auto standards have
been applied to state taxation affecting natural resource extraction in
Supreme Court decisions addressing the constitutionality of taxes at
both the production and consumption ends of the domestic energy
spectrum. In Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue,I the Court ex-
amined the scope of a nonproducing state's apportioned income tax in
relation to net income resulting from integrated operations, including
extraction and production in other states. 12 At the production end, a
severance tax which operated to increase costs to out-of-state consum-
ers was upheld in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana.13 The two
cases confirm a broader scope of state taxation and constitutional in-
volvement with it. They seem dispositive of much of what can be as-
serted in the way of constitutional limitations on forms of taxation
enacted or proposed by the energy producing and consuming states.
But analysis of the rationale and scope of the Court's determinations in
these and other recent decisions suggests, in at least one aspect, that a
nonproducing state's power to effectively levy on part of the increased
oil and gas receipts base is limited or possibly precluded.
These two cases are obviously significant in the constitutional
evaluation of state taxation within the federal system. A close consid-
eration of certain elements of the decisions in the specific context of the
growing array of taxes on businesses whose receipts include the in-
creased value of extracted petroleum resources and petroleum products
indicates possible further definition of constitutional limitations on
consuming state legislation, particularly where gross receipts is the tax
measure.
10. See id. at 279.
11. 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
12. Id. at 210.
13. 453 U.S. 609 (1981); cf. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981). In Maryland, the
Court held that a "first-use tax" on offshore natural gas was unconstitutional by reason of its
discrimination against interstate commerce. Id. at 756.
[Vol. 18:359
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For taxpayers engaged in interstate operations involving energy
resource activity, the Court's decisions, though unfavorable in result to
the taxpayers involved, may nevertheless portend limits on the tax
reach of nonproducing states pursuing tax policy that seeks to levy on
increased upstream energy values at the point of extraction. The cases
contain statements which suggest that if New York's special tax on in-
tegrated oil companies operates as described by the media, then consti-
tutional review based upon its actual effect could make its validity
questionable. This is because (1) the tax has the explicit effect of multi-
ple taxation of the taxpayer's gross revenue from the privilege of petro-
leum extraction; (2) it is imposed almost wholly from outside the state
of production; and (3) because of the tax's passthrough prohibition, it
may not be as readily justified, in terms of apportionment, as the con-
suming or market state gross receipts taxes which have won approval of
the Court.
Proper consideration of these issues requires an elementary defini-
tion of the forms of taxation involved to aid in comparison of any non-
producing state tax in the energy tax confrontation. The critical point
of analysis is the operative incidence and measure of the tax consid-
ered. Thus, regardless of nominal incidence, the actual economic effect
of a market state's extension of taxing authority should be considered
to determine if a gross revenue levy is being imposed on productive
activity involving mineral deposits located outside its borders.
In terms of general definitional classification, a "severance tax"
can generally be defined as an excise upon the privilege of taking or
extracting a resource. 14 The tax may be imposed on a base determined
by extracted quantity or its value. Where value of the extracted re-
source is the standard of liability, the severance tax can have incidence
very similar to a tax on the gross receipts of a particular business.
However, a critical distinction is that the severance tax is technically
assessable even though the resource is not sold but is merely consumed
for personal use or otherwise used or disposed of following
extraction. 15
A "franchise tax" is a tax on the franchise of a corporation, or the
right and privilege of carrying on business in the character of a corpo-
ration, for the purposes for which it was created and in the conditions
14. Gulf Ref. Co. v. McFarland, 154 La. 251, -, 97 So. 433, 434 (1923).
15. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Heath, 254 Ark. 847, -, 497 S.W.2d 30, 32 (1973).
19831
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which surround it.16
. A "gross receipts" tax is essentially any excise tax measured by the
gross receipts of the taxpayer. It may be limited to those receipts aris-
ing from the exercise of the privilege of engaging in an occupation or
activity.'7 It is theoretically not operative on the act of engaging in an
activity or exercising a privilege in the absence of gross receipts, as in
the case of extraction of minerals without sale. However, a constructive
sale provision governing particular uses or transfers involving taxable
activity could effectively give a nominal gross receipts tax the same ef-
fect as a severance tax in those circumstances. Further, in the context
of this Article regarding the imposition of a tax in part conditioned
upon existence of extractive activity, a more generalized definition
must be qualified.
Finally, an "income tax" is generally defined as a tax levied upon
the net income or profits of the taxpayer after return of capital and
deduction of expenses and costs of generating taxable earnings.' 8
The Supreme Court expressly and implicitly noted the distinctions
between the nominal and the practical effects of producing and con-
suming state taxes measured by the revenue or earnings of energy com-
panies in its application of apportionment standards to a nonproducing
state's income tax in Exxon, and to a producing state's severance tax in
Commonwealth. It is submitted that these cases suggest that if a non-
producing state's tax is of such narrow scope as to attach exclusively to
gross receipts flowing from purely extraterritorial production activity,
the tax may not meet the first two standards of the four-part test of
Complete Auto unless it has a more precise apportionment giving
greater recognition to the situs state's relation to that activity.
In Commonwealth, the Court was asked to decide the constitution-
ality of a Montana severance tax imposed upon the production of coal
within that state.' 9 The tax, which ranged in rates up to thirty percent
of the value or contract sales price of the coal, was imposed on produc-
tion which was in large part committed to interstate commerce and
consumption in other states.2 ° In examining that part of the challenge
to the tax based upon the commerce clause, the Court applied the tests
16. Scott-Rice Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 503 P.2d 208, 210 (Okla. 1972).
17. R. HAIG & C. SHoup, THE SALES TAX IN THE AMERICAN STATES 3-4 (1934).
18. . HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION; CASES AND MATE-
RIALS 29 (4th ed. 1978).
19. 453 U.S. 609, 612 (1981).
20. See id. at 613, 617-18.
[V/ol. 18:359
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enunciated in Complete Auto.2 1 The Court concluded that earlier deci-
sions which treated severance tax as purely local and not subject to
commerce clause limitations are no longer correct. 2 The Court over-
ruled the thesis of those early decisions which held that severance taxes
upon extraction were imposed prior to entry into a narrower notion of
interstate commerce, and thus not subject to commerce clause stan-
dards.23 The application of the standards of Complete Auto was made
in response to the assertion that Montana was seeking to export its sev-
erance tax to consuming states and that this unduly burdened interstate
commerce. The Court found that the essential criteria of constitution-
ality were present. First, it concluded that there was an obvious
nexus.24 As discussed in greater detail below, the Court also found a
clear rationale for exclusive allocation of the tax to the state of the taxa-
ble severance. The latter finding, unequivocally stated, obviated con-
sideration of whether there was fair apportionment.25 The Court held
further that the facially neutral tax on all producers within the state
was not unconstitutionally burdensome and did not discriminate
against interstate commerce despite being shifted primarily to consum-
ers in other states.26 In a somewhat strained abstention,27 the Court
ruled that the tax bore a fair relation to the business activity of the
taxpayers within the taxing state.28 It found that the tax on a percent-
age of gross earnings within the state of those actually taxed meant a
fair relationship to the taxed activity existed.29 The level or rate of tax-
ation was passed off as a matter for legislative rather than judicial
determination.30
The Commonwealth case broke from the Court's existing precedent
and brought state severance taxes within the scope of constitutional in-
quiry under the commerce clause. As a result, previous judicial treat-
ment of such a tax as local and separate from commerce clause
standards of nexus, fair apportionment, nondiscrimination, and fair re-
lation to services of the taxing state, was overruled. This elimination of
21. See id. at 627-29.
22. Id. at 614-15.
23. Id. at 617.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 617-20; The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REv. 93, 103 (1981).
27. See 453 U.S. at 644-46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, supra
note 26, at 103.
28. 453 U.S. at 626-27; The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, supra note 26, at 106.
29. See 453 U.S. at 626-29; The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, supra note 26, at 105-06.
30. 453 U.S. at 628; The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, supra note 26, at 106.
1983]
7
Miers: The Urban Severance Tax: Some Questions as to Apportionment
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1982
TULSA L4WJOURN4L
the prior immunity of severance taxes from consideration under the
commerce clause, and movement to the current practical analysis as to
such taxes, would seemingly require more frequent multiple taxation
inquiry. This would involve interaction of such taxes with taxes of
nonproducing states which are directed at receipts generated by the ex-
tractive operations also subject to producing state severance taxes.
As indicated, the Supreme Court responded in Commonwealth to
the taxpayers' challenge of the tax by summarily disposing of the initial
two standards of the Complete Auto test. As to the requirement of a
taxable nexus, the Court concurred in the determination of the Mon-
tana Supreme Court that there could be no argument that a substantial,
in fact the only, nexus of the severance tax in question was in the pro-
ducing state of Montana.31 With equal force and certainty, as to the
requirement of fair apportionment, the Court determined: "Nor is
there any question here regarding apportionment or potential multiple
taxation, for as the state court observed, 'the severance can occur in no
other state' and 'no other state can tax the severance.' "32 The literal
terms of this conclusion provide potential for the assertion that discrim-
inatory multiple taxation arises from a special nonproducing state tax
which seeks to capture revenue, in whole or in part, in a manner having
the same practical effect as a severance tax, as suggested by the label
given such provisions by the media.
Before the recent formation and restatement of standards marked
by the Complete Auto decision, the constraints upon state taxation
grounded in the commerce clause had historically shown, despite an
irregular case by case development, a very broad pattern or trend of
interpretation. The same fundamental requirement of a taxable nexus
or minimal relationship as now forms a part of the restated controlling
standards was present in that pattern of precedents. Beyond that, it was
generally held that an apportioned net income tax could be levied on
interstate commerce.33 As to the right of states to impose a tax mea-
sured by gross receipts on the privilege of manufacture or production, it
was generally held that the point of incidence of the tax was control-
ling. 34 Significantly, taxes could generally be imposed upon local man-
31. 453 U.S. at 617.
32. Id.
33. E.g., Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 452 (1959);
see, e.g., Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 121 (1920); United States
Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 329 (1918).
34. See SUaCOMM. ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE OF THE HousE COMM.
[Vol. 18:359
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ufacture or production before actual shipment,35 while the Court
looked with disfavor on gross receipts taxes imposed on interstate sales
by the state of shipment.36 Finally, gross receipts and use taxes by the
state of delivery had judicial approval,37 although the rationale for
such results was sometimes less clearly reasoned and set forth by the
Court than was expected.38
Because of the fiscal stakes involved, the special energy taxes are
likely to be a source of growing litigation and further development of
the fundamental principles set out in Complete Auto. The large reve-
nue potential has already stimulated an expansion of the range of con-
stitutional impact on taxation of energy production destined for
interstate commerce. But at the same time, this new focus on the con-
stitutional principles, at the level of extraction and production, argua-
bly has the effect of being more restrictive of the nonproducing states'
ability to tap the revenue base in this line of commerce.
The Court's statements in Commonwealth,39 overruling the ration-
ale of Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co. that severance or production taxes
are purely local and beyond the scope of the commerce clause,4° were
coupled with the admonition that the four-pronged standards of Com-
plete Auto and Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner4 should apply equally
to severance or production taxes as they do to other state privilege or
income taxes affecting interstate commerce.42 With these tests deter-
mining the constitutionality of such taxes on operations involving inter-
state transactions, such taxes would presumably be more susceptible to
some new requirement of comity with both actual or potential taxing
schemes of nonproducing states which have a nexus of downstream ac-
tivities involving the mineral.
However, the Supreme Court's determinations in Commonwealth,
ON THE JUDICIARY, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 565, 89th
Cong., Ist Sess. 1037-38 (1965).
35. Eg., Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172, 177-79 (1923) (mining of iron ore);
American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459, 463-64 (1919) (manufacturing).
36. E.g., J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311-14 (1938).
37. Eg., General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 437-39 (1964); McGoldrick v.
Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 57-58 (1940).
38. See Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business and the Supreme Court, 1974 Ter m
Standard Pressed Steel and Colonial Pipeline, 62 VA. L. REv. 149, 149-55 (1976); Comment, More
Ado About Gross Receoits Taxes, 60 HARv. L. REv. 501, 510 & n.48 (1947).
39. 453 U.S. 609, 617 (1981).
40. 260 U.S. 245, 259-61 (1922).
41. 445 U.S. 425, 443 (1980).
42. 453 U.S. at 615-17; see also Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207,226-27
(1980) (Court will apply Mobil and Complete Auto standards to an income tax).
1983]
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with respect to the first two standards of nexus and fair apportionment,
resulted in the Montana severance tax in question being in, perhaps, a
more constitutionally stable position than under the exclusionary rule
Heisler provided. The Court administered the commerce clause tests
of nexus and apportionment and found that a state severance tax in-
volving extraction of minerals committed to interstate commerce
passed without reservation.43 This result was reached when consider-
ing a tax which was wholly unapportioned by the producing state.
Thus, in the absence of either discrimination or lack of fair rela-
tion to the taxed activity, the severance or production type tax has been
found to be absolved of any potential constitutional infirmity by reason
of a lack of apportionment. The Court's conclusion on that point
leaves an interpretive impression that although it set aside the shelter of
severance and production taxes which Heisler and other decisions fur-
nished, a new, equally inflexible, and obviously more tempered resist-
ance of such taxes to constitutional challenge has been put in place by
the Commonwealth treatment of the apportionment standard.
This rule would seem to increase potential constitutional conflict
in the interaction of a nonproducing state's special gross receipts privi-
lege tax on oil companies with a producing state's severance or produc-
tion tax. Once the factor of nexus is met, the element of fair
apportionment is the next essential to any nonproducing state tax mea-
sured by oil and gas company revenues, and when seeking to tap the
energy value base at or near the point of extraction in other states, an
acceptable apportionment may be difficult or perhaps impossible to
achieve.
The Court's conclusion in Commonwealth that there is no require-
ment for apportionment of a severance tax other than to the situs state
places an importance on tax classification and incidence which proba-
bly cannot be overstated for those taxpayers affected in an interstate
energy tax confrontation. Where a nonproducing state tax is only a
general provision imposed upon the local exercise of the privilege of
doing business measured by sales, apportionment relative to that activ-
ity would seem to meet the requirements now in effect under the com-
merce clause, even if measured in the same manner as a tax imposed on
some more particularized element of the corporate operation by an-
other state. But a narrowing of the object of taxable activity may result
in a much more vulnerable extension of a nonproducing state's powers.
43. See 453 U.S. at 617; supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
[Vol. 18:359
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In the Exxon case, the Supreme Court found that a unitary busi-
ness, made up of distribution and marketing of petroleum products
within the taxing state of Wisconsin and also exploration, production,
and refining of crude oil exclusively outside that state, was being con-
ducted.' The Court rejected the contentions of the taxpayer that its
income from its exploration and production activity should not be ap-
portioned to Wisconsin. The taxpayer had reasoned that it engaged in
such activity only at a situs outside the state, and that the company's
internal functional accounting demonstrated an absence of the minimal
connection of those sources of income with the taxing state necessary to
support apportionment.45
The Court found that while such separate accounting might serve
other purposes, it did not necessarily reflect the integration of all opera-
tions of a unitary business for the purpose of an apportioned taxation
of all its income by a state in which some part of those unitary business
activities was conducted.46 The Court made the determination that the
standards of constitutional law applicable under the due process 47 and
commerce clauses do not in any way mandate that income which can
be separately accounted for as flowing from exploration and produc-
tion wholly outside the taxing state be allocated to the producing
states.48 If a sufficient nexus exists between a unitary business and the
states seeking to tax its income on an apportioned basis, then the partic-
ular geographic location of the extraction of the unitary operation will
not preclude such taxes.49
The Court concluded that a unitary business existed in Exxon's
vertical integration.50 The taxpayer's production activity was found to
be a part of that unitary business.51 As a result, income from that pro-
duction was not separately allocable to the situs state of the production,
but rather was subject to apportionment in the taxing, and nonproduc-
ing, state.52
The Court reasoned that as a part of the unitary flow of income to
44. Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1980).
45. Id. at 220-21.
46. Id. at 221-22.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
48. 447 U.S. at 225-26 (due process); id. at 229-30 (commerce clause).
49. Id. at 230.
50. Id. at 224 (Court agreed with Wisconsin Supreme Court's conclusion that Exxon was a
unitary business).
51. See id. at 226 (Court found that Exxon had not proved its functional departments, i.e.,
exploration and production, refining, and marketing, were separate enterprises).
52. See id. at 223-24, 229-30.
1983]
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which the taxing state had a sufficient relationship or nexus, the income
from production was taxable on a formula apportionment basis even
though it all actually arose from business activities conducted outside
the taxing state. The incidence of the tax was net income of the unitary
business, regardless of the nature of activity generating it. The Court
expressed the same thoughts stated earlier in the same term in Mobil:
that a fairly apportioned tax of net income from interstate activities
may be made by any state where there was a minimal contact or nexus
with the taxing state without situs of particular earning activities or
assets necessitating special allocation of income to the state of their
situs. 53
In refuting Exxon's contentions that its exploration and production
activities were not sufficiently connected with the taxing state, the
Court stated that, absent a special showing of a separate and discrete
business enterprise, the particular situs of the activity which is the
source of the income in a unitary business is essentially irrelevant.-4
The Court emphasized that a stream of income was the object of the
taxation in question and that it flowed from a unitary business in inter-
state commerce that had sufficient contact with the taxing state.55
The Court's review was limited to apportionment of production
income generated through Exxon's vertically integrated operations.56
The state taxing authority had determined that the Wisconsin statute
required that income derived from the sale of crude oil and gas to third
parties at the wellhead be allocated to the situs state and be excluded
from apportionment.57 Accordingly, the apportionment of income
from that activity was expressly omitted from due process and com-
merce clause review.5 8
In analyzing the tax in terms of its practical effect to determine
whether the four-pronged Complete Auto test was satisfied, the Court
pointed out that the tax in question was on income, not property own-
53. See id. at 219-20.
54. Id. at 223-24 (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 439
(1980)); id. at 229-30.
55. 447 U.S. at 226.
56. See id. at 226 n.10 ("[W]e need not address the issue of whether the Due Process Clause
would require such allocation rather than apportionment."); Id. at 227 n.1 1 ("[W]e do not here
address the issue of whether the Commerce Clause requires allocation of income derived from the
sale of crude oil and gas at the wellhead to third parties to the situs State rather than
apportionment.").
57. Id. at 226 n.10.
58. Id. at 226 n.10, 227 n.1; see supra note 56.
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ership.59 The income derived from production had a sufficient relation-
ship through the unitary business presence in both the producing and
consuming state to be apportioned to the latter. The Court added that
the taxing of such income on an apportioned basis was not dependent
upon the existence or form of a similar tax in the producing state.60
The concluding footnote to Justice Marshall's opinion in Exxon
related to the issue of multiple taxation. That footnote suggests that the
commerce clause standards now being followed may not necessarily
dictate the same result for other forms of extraterritorial state taxation
of oil and gas production as were applied with respect to net income
resulting from Exxon's unitary business. In particular, Justice Marshall
stated that the existence of severance taxes in the producing state did
not result in a forbidden multiple taxation when the consuming state
imposed an apportioned income tax on the income from the function
subject to such severance taxes.61 In expressing this conclusion, Justice
Marshall stated that severance taxes are directed at the gross value of
the mineral extracted or the quantity of production rather than the net
income from the production activities. 62 Accordingly, he approved the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's conclusion that the fact that producing
states may impose severance taxes which have been held to be occupa-
tion taxes or property taxes does not preclude another state's effort to
reach a proportionate share of the taxpayer's net income.63 There was
no further elaboration on the suggested distinction between the types of
taxes, or room for possible differences in constitutional results if a non-
producing state tax on gross value of the mineral extracted were
involved.
Footnote twelve to the Exxon opinion is particularly significant
because of its possible implication. It could easily be a signal of the
Court's general view that excises imposed on interstate transactions
cannot enjoy the same scope which apportionment formulas afford in-
come taxes. It may also suggest that the Court reserved the latitude to
apply the prevailing constitutional standards to state gross receipts
taxes imposed upon the exercise of specified privileges by taxpayers op-
59. 447 U.S. at 228.
60. Id. at 228-29.
61. "The Wisconsin Supreme Court therefore properly concluded that '[t]he fact that the
producing states may impose. . . severance taxes which have been held to be occupation taxes or
property taxes does not render unfair or unconstitutional Wisconsin's efforts to reach a propor-
tionate share of the taxpayer's income.'" Id. at 229 n.12 (citation omitted).
62. Id. at 228 n.12.
63. Id. at 229 n.12; see supra note 61.
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erating in interstate commerce, as opposed to taxes levied on their uni-
tary net income. The implication presented is that a type of gross
revenue tax of extraterritorial mineral production by a consuming state
involves a significantly higher risk of multiple taxation than an appor-
tioned income tax on net income from the unitary enterprise with a
taxable nexus in the taxing state. The measure of such risk presumably
should be determined under the same "practical effect" standard said
to be followed by the Court in Complete Auto and its progeny. That
standard should dictate that the nominal incidence of gross receipts
taxes may be of less significance in terms of actual economic conse-
quence; and that taxes measured by gross energy production values be-
ing adopted in the reputed revenue struggle by consuming states could
be found to lack the requisite constitutional characteristics where they
effectively bear upon the same activity as a local severance tax in the
state of production.
II. THE ROLE OF APPORTIONMENT IN THE ENERGY TAX
CONFRONTATION
Long before the more definitive Complete Auto rules were set out,
it was well established that the respective states are not literally bound
to imposing income taxes which have absolutely no reach beyond their
borders; that interstate commerce could be taxed in each state it affects;
and that income generated in part from activities outside a taxing state
could be taxed by it. These taxes can occur provided that fair appor-
tionment operates to bring home only that part of the taxable revenue
which is fairly related to the local activity for which the taxing jurisdic-
tion can ask a return. Where exact lines should be drawn in a constitu-
tional tax panoply with as many as fifty variant apportioning and
allocation methods has, of course, not been easily determined in a case-
by-case drafting.
Certain basic guidelines and trends have emerged. The most pro-
nounced guideline is that apportionment is supposed to reflect the ex-
tent and nature of a unitary business activity within the taxing state.65
Apportionment is fundamentally a sharing mechanism, intended to di-
vide, in a workable approximation, a multistate tax base among the
64. See, eg., Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 461-62
(1959).
65. Hartman, State Taxation of Corporate Income from a Multlstate Business, 13 VAND. L.
REv. 21, 31 (1959).
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several taxing jurisdictions. The essential goals of apportionment are
the avoidance of undue burden on interstate commerce, which can
come from a multiplication of taxation which will not be borne by
purely local commerce, and the restriction of the scope of state taxing
authority consistent with standards of due process.
In the states' efforts to secure increased portions of the energy rev-
enue base generated in large part by activity outside their borders, the
method of apportionment under the basic constitutional standards is
made increasingly significant, since it is both the means and the justifi-
cation for expanded tax recoveries by the states involved.
A gross receipts tax on interstate sales has been judicially ap-
proved even though it falls in part upon sales generated or flowing
from an activity also subjected to a production tax by the state in which
that activity occurs.66 Policy considerations may, however, dictate a
different rule with respect to a gross receipts tax reaching revenues
which also serve as the base for a natural resource severance tax.
Those policy considerations may have been the rationale for the
Court's unequivocal conclusion regarding apportionment as to the sev-
erance tax in Commonwealth. A result may be that separate and dis-
tinct application of the second rule of the four-prong test of Complete
Auto is warranted in the case where such a severance or production tax
is followed by a narrowly framed gross receipts tax which is also effec-
tively measured by the gross revenue of the same extractive activity.
Such special application could be readily premised upon the actual
practical effect of a state imposing a gross receipts tax exclusively
aimed at integrated oil companies which engage in oil and gas produc-
tion only in other states, and have local distribution and sales of refined
products in the taxing state.
This suggested result is not proposed without recognizing the pre-
cedent that a taxpayer who asserts that a particular application or
method fails to provide a constitutionally acceptable apportionment
has an extremely difficult burden of proof to meet.67 The apportion-
66. General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 448-49 (1964). See infra text accom-
panying notes 100 & 106-08 for a further discussion of General Motors.
67. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 274 (1978) ("[A] formula-produced assessment
will only be disturbed when the taxpayer has proved by 'clear and cogent evidence' that the in-
come attributed to the State is in fact 'out of all appropriate proportions to the business transacted
. . . in that State'... or has 'led to a grossly distorted result."' (citations omitted)); see Bass,
Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271, 282-84 (1924) (company failed to
show statutory method of apportionment was arbitrary or unreasonable); Underwood Typewriter
Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 120-21 (1920).
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ment required by the Court in the case of state income taxes has con-
sistently required much less than an exact matching of the net income
base with the taxpayer's presence in the taxing state.68 But the tolerable
degree of imprecision may be much smaller when a scheme seeks to
place a gross receipts tax on an activity or group of activities with a
situs which is largely or completely outside the taxing state. Disregard
of exactness in the application of an apportionment method seems less
justifiable in such a case.
Where the object of the tax is very limited in scope, and the bur-
den of the tax is more severe,69 there should arguably be a greater re-
sponsibility for apportionment incongruity. The taxing authority then
has less basis to assert that it cannot expediently provide offsets for
foreign state taxes or for out-of-state taxpayer activity in its apportion-
ment scheme. If the taxable privilege is a single form of business en-
tity, engaging in a specially limited set of activities, the probabilities of
inconsistency with known or potential forms of taxes of other states
with respect to the same privilege are easier to foresee and measure. A
prohibited degree of multiple taxation, which fair apportionment is in-
tended to remedy, should perhaps be addressed by more than a rough
approximation in such circumstances.
Notwithstanding the Exxon and Mobil decisions as to net income
taxes, if a tax measured by gross revenue is only imposed when the
privilege of operating in corporate form includes an activity which is
known to occur virtually totally beyond the borders of the taxing state,
a higher degree of exactness in the apportionment may be appropriate.
Gross receipts taxation of activity which can only occur at sites located
exclusively outside the taxing state is in itself suggestive of unfair ap-
portionment and due process shortcomings.
The multiple taxation concept of commerce clause application, as
a definitive precursor of today's standards, was set out in 1938 in West-
ern Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue.70 There the Supreme Court laid
down what appears to be the foundation for much of the reasoning now
followed by the Court to resolve contests of state tax raising questions
of commerce clause limitation. The importance of the multiple taxa-
tion concept is obviously magnified today by the Court's unqualified
reconfirmation of the corollary proposition stated in Western Live
68. See, eg., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1978); Underwood Type-
writer Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 120-21 (1920).
69. See United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 328-29 (1918).
70. 303 U.S. 250, 259 (1938).
[Vol. 18:359
16
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 18 [1982], Iss. 3, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol18/iss3/1
"URBAN SEVERANCE TAX"
Stock, that interstate commerce is in and of itself the proper object of
state taxation.7" Further, the Court concluded that the commerce
clause is to be applied only in a practical sense.72 These theories ex-
pand the scope of state taxing powers in an economy where multistate
fusion of taxable activity is now more the rule than the exception. The
result may be a more likely occurrence of multiple taxation in the case
of gross receipts taxes seeking either to levy upon values flowing from
activities outside the taxing state, or to direct the impact of tax on a
local activity to other states.
Justice Stone, in his opinion in Western Live Stock, concluded that
there is a risk of multiple taxation when one state is allowed to indis-
criminately levy on gross revenues of interstate commerce, but that this
could be obviated by a fair apportionment method.73 His landmark
analysis noted that local taxes, even if fairly apportioned, will without
question operate to increase the cost of doing business in more than a
single state, and there is really no constitutional basis, under the com-
merce clause, to limit or preclude such taxes for that reason.74
The constitutional difficulty was seen to arise only when a tax, par-
ticularly one on gross receipts, is imposed to an extent that transcends
local involvement in interstate transactions and comes to rest on inter-
state commerce in and of itself in a degree not fairly related to the
taxing state's role in the activities. Justice Stone theorized that if one
state is allowed to tax to such an extent, then nothing would stand in
the way of all states enjoying the same power. This would result in a
potential multiplication of tax burdens which would create barriers to
thwart the freedom of commerce intended to be secured by the com-
merce clause. To preclude this result, apportionment of gross receipts
taxes was recognized as a practical way to permit states touched by
interstate commerce to fairly tax the activities involved.75 In the case of
a tax with a narrow classification, Justice Stone's theory is particularly
provocative in its suggestion that where a gross receipts tax is aimed at
a privilege which can occur only in one taxing jurisdiction, there should
be no real threat of cumulative burdens which breach the constitutional
standard.
That theorem was later criticized as an oversimplification or a play
71. Id. at 254.
72. Id. at 259.
73. Id. at 256-57.
74. Id. at 254-55.
75. Id. at 255-57.
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on words which itself fails to recognize practical considerations of taxa-
tion.76 A corollary of the concept may be that a tax measured by gross
revenue generated by mineral production in a particular state is im-
properly multiplied if a substantive duplication occurs in another state,
because all the taxable events occurred in the first state and are beyond
the "control and taxing power" of any other state.
Under these standards, the value of the minerals to the producer at
the time and point of severance, even if enhanced by the prospect of
distribution and marketing in another state, would be taxable by the
situs state without apportionment, because no other state could levy
upon that activity. Thus, if the contours of the apportionment standard
as they appear to have been shaped in the Western Live Stock opinion
remain intact today as announced in Commonwealth, a state other than
the one where the extractive production occurs may be without the ca-
pacity to constitutionally apportion gross values associated with it as a
measure of tax on the activity of a taxpayer operating within its
borders.
Commonwealth's specification of an activity which is taxable ex-
clusively in one state might on its face seem out of step with the ap-
proval of wide-ranging apportionment found in the Court's recent
decisions in Exxon and Mobil. However, those cases, read together
with Commonwealth, imply that apportionment relative to each state's
involvement with oil and gas extraction may have different bounds in
the case of a gross revenue tax base containing both production and
distribution functions of an integrated energy company, as opposed to
a tax on the net income from the unitary operation of the whole. The
possibility of such a distinction in energy tax confrontation certainly
remains open to assertion under the Court's decisions in the three cases.
III. THE NEW YORK "URBAN SEVERANCE TAx"-ANALYsIs OF
APPORTIONMENT
The leading prototype, and to date most controversial, of the spe-
cial taxes on petroleum revenues is the one enacted by the State of New
York in 1980. 77 It is likely that this statute is the most extreme example
of those types of taxes which might be chosen for testing by the stan-
76. Comment, supra note 38, at 516-21; see Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 254 (1946);
Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 442-55 (1939) (Black, J., dissenting).
77. N.Y. TAx LAW § 182 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
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dards specified in Complete Auto and the Court's decisions after Com-
plete Auto in the multistate energy area.
The New York tax is narrowly directed only at vertically inte-
grated oil companies' exercise of the privilege of doing business in the
State of New York. 8 For purposes of the tax, an oil company is de-
fined as a vertically integrated petroleum corporation engaged in ex-
traction of crude oil and downstream refining, distribution, and
marketing, with extraction or production exceeding one hundred thou-
sand average barrels of crude oil per day and refining capacity in excess
of one hundred seventy-five thousand average barrels per day.7 9 The
conduct of such activities by a fifty percent affiliate is attributed to the
taxpayer for purposes of fixing and measuring liability. 0 The measure
of the tax is the worldwide gross receipts of such a taxpayer, appor-
tioned to the state generally on the basis of the proportion of gross
receipts within the state to worldwide gross receipts."' In the most con-
troversial provision of the law, the taxpayer is precluded from passing
the burden of the tax through to any customer in the State of New
York.8 2
The drafters of the law appear to have drawn heavily from the
theoretical underpinning of the Exxon case in defining entities subject
to the tax. The statute looks only to tax vertically integrated oil compa-
nies which possess the requisite characteristics of a unitary business
whose extraterritorial extraction is functionally related to the down-
stream distribution activity in New York. As indicated, that integra-
tion was found in Exxon to justify an apportioned tax on the net
income of the whole enterprise.8 3
The New York statute, however, levies a gross receipts tax. While
the existence of a unitary flow of "income" supports an apportioned net
income tax which is derived in part from activity wholly outside the
78. Id. § 182(l).
79. Id. § 182(2)(a). The statute, as originally enacted, defined "oil company" as "every cor-
poration formed for or engaged in the business of importing or causing to be imported into [the]
state for sale in [the] state, extracting, producing, refining, manufacturing, compounding or selling
petroleum." Ch. 271, § 3, 1980 N.Y. Laws 424,426. This definition of "oil company" was retroac-
tively amended on November 11, 1981, to apply to vertically integrated oil companies. Ch. 1043,
§ 65, 1982 N.Y. Laws 1981-114, 1981-142 to -143 (1981); see also Merit Oil of New York, Inc. v.
New York State Tax Comm'n, 111 Misc. 2d 118, -, 443 N.Y.S.2d 604, 606-07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1981) (court held that original definition of oil company in § 182 was unconstitutional).
80. N.Y. TAX LAw § 182(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
81. Id. § 182(2)(b), (3).
82. Id. § 182(1 1).
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taxing state, functional integration of out-of-state production with in-
state distribution has not been explicitly utilized to support an appor-
tioned tax on gross receipts under the Court's new and more pro-
nounced application of practical standards. To establish a difference in
result between such a tax and a net income tax, the taxpayer would
doubtless need to convincingly develop practical and economic distinc-
tions to overcome the Court's view of unitary effect as to taxation of net
income. But, as suggested, the door may be still open to such proof.
In the case of a gross receipts or gross revenue tax, the uni-
tary/integrated operations pattern so carefully followed in the special
New York tax on oil companies may conceivably increase, rather than
minimize, constitutional difficulties in the multistate setting. A gross
receipts privilege tax, when oil and gas production is the initial point of
generation of taxable values, lends itself to a more geographically
based division of the constituent taxable activities of the taxpayer. This
may be particularly true where that function occurs almost exclusively
outside of the taxing state.
While the facial incidence of the special New York tax is upon the
doing of business in the state, by definition only an oil company which
extracts, produces, refines, and markets petroleum products is subject
to the tax. An oil company engaged in less than all of those functions
would not be liableY4 With this classification of taxpayers who must
bear the tax for exercising a corporate franchise, extractive operations
are made a sine qua non of liability, notwithstanding the fact that virtu-
ally no petroleum extraction presently occurs in New York.
By reason of the statute's narrow classification of corporations sub-
ject to liability and its expansive revenue base, the tax arguably does
equate, in large measure, to a tax imposed on the extraterritorial privi-
lege of extraction and production of petroleum; subject, of course, to
the definitional shortcoming that it is not imposed by reason of removal
of oil and gas from land. There is no oil and gas severance or produc-
tion tax imposed by the State of New York on production occurring
within the state.
In this regard, strong authoritative caveats exist providing that the
measure of a tax is not to be confused with its incidence in any determi-
84. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 182(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); Shell Oil Co. v. New York
State Tax Comm'n, Nos. 43145, 43362, slip op. at 4 (N.Y. App. Div. Jan. 6, 1983); Appellant's
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nation of its validity under the commerce clause, 85 even though the
Court has sometimes reportedly failed to observe the distinction. 6
This discussion is not intended to suggest that because values arising
from severance of oil and gas are the basis for measurement of a tax,
like the New York special franchise tax, its incidence automatically
then falls on such activity. Rather, the form of the New York statute,
taken as a whole, makes it operative only upon corporations which ex-
tract and produce oil and gas as a part of an integrated petroleum
business.
A corporation which never engages in extraction of oil or gas
would escape payment of the tax, as corporate taxpayers exercising a
franchise in New York which do not engage in oil and gas extraction
somewhere in the world are not subject to liability.8 7 The tax is tai-
lored and selective, as distinguished from a uniformly applied corpo-
rate franchise tax measured by gross receipts from every corporation's
general business operations. It insists upon a channelization of a spe-
cial tax base into the state and simultaneously imposes an absolute re-
quirement that the economic burden of the tax be absorbed outside the
state. Only an integrated oil company which is involved in petroleum
production from the wellhead through product distribution is subjected
to the tax.
Without question, a substantive objective of the statute is to secure
a share of actual out-of-state values for taxation in New York by rea-
son of contact with any taxpayer having such operations. The tax is not
in the nature of a consumer tax, and cannot effectively be converted to
one, because of the express incidence parameters in the law's anti-pass-
through provision. 8
As mentioned above, the possible unresolved apportionment issues
in the context of gross receipts or ad valorem taxation, as suggested by
the footnote in Exxon, may be presented for resolution in a challenge
to New York's form of statute. The potential collision of the severance
tax apportionment standard set forth by the Court in Commonwealth
85. Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: .4 Survey and an Appraisal, 46 VA. L.
REV. 1051, 1074-77, 1110 (1960); Hellerstein, supra note 38, at 178 n.150.
86. Developments in the Law-FederalLimitations on State Taxation ofInterstate Business, 75
HARV. L. REV. 953, 960-61 (1962); see Hartman, supra note 85, at 1099. See Justice Rutledge's
concurring opinion in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 259-83 (1946), for an insightful analysis
calling for practical treatment of questions of measurement, incidence, and multiple taxation
under the commerce clause.
87. See supra notes 78-79 & 84 and accompanying text.
88. See N.Y. TAx LAW § 182(11) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
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with an effective targeting of extraterritorial extractive operations
found in the New York law would seem to provide an excellent issue
for determination by the new and supposedly more realistic approach
to judicial resolution of state taxation questions.
If the privilege of extraction can be subjected to an excise only in
the location where it occurs, as Commonwealth indicates, then a foreign
state's gross receipts tax so specifically conditioned upon conduct of
that activity may cause inequitable multiple taxation, even if cast in the
form of a franchise tax. Certainly, an arguable result is that apportion-
ment of any part of that segment of the tax base to a nonproducing
state should not be permissible if gross receipts from such activity
rather than the net income of the unitary business of a taxpayer is the
measure of the tax. Here, the Court's distinction between an appor-
tionment of a tax on the income of an interstate enterprise, as con-
trasted with a gross value tax on a privilege exercised by it, as implied
in Exxon, appears to be very meaningful. While the Supreme Court's
footnoted caveats focused upon a potential multiplication involving
consuming state taxes with producing situs state property taxes, the
mineral production normally subject to severance taxes is intrinsically
related to the producing real property in the producing state.89
With regard to the effect of Commonwealth's standard of appor-
tionment on a special oil company tax like New York's, some signifi-
cance can also be found in an observation offered in the Supreme
Court's discussion of apportionment standards in Mobil. In Mobil, the
Court considered the issue of apportioned taxation of dividend receipts
of an integrated oil company and its producing subsidiaries. In re-
jecting the taxpayer's contentions regarding apportionment of income
being duplicative and unconstitutionally burdensome, the Court re-
fused to accept the contention that allocation of all dividend income to
the taxpayer's domicile was appropriate. Nevertheless, the Court ex-
pressly acknowledged that a fatal inconsistency and a prohibited de-
gree of multiple taxation would exist in any particular circumstance
where exclusive allocation to one state is accepted or required, stating,
"Taxation by apportionment and taxation by allocation to a single situs
are theoretically incommensurate, and if the latter method is constitu-
tionally preferred, a tax based on the former cannot be sustained."90
89. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 624 (1981) (noting the analo-
gous nature of severance taxes and property taxes in the constitutional context).
90. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 444-45 (1980); see also Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 384 (1952) ("The rule which permits taxation by two or more
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The reasoning of this observation, and the Court's offering it as a
caveat to a decision marking a departure from separate allocation, may
take on more importance if the growing state energy tax conflicts are
presented for judicial resolution. The Court's acknowledgment of the
logical inconsistency in such a situation would arguably necessitate that
a nonproducing state tax on extraterritorial extractive values be pre-
cluded by the type of total apportionment or allocation of that tax base
to the producing state which was approved in Commonwealth.91 If the
nonproducing state, for example, New York, is attempting to impose a
gross receipts tax upon extractive activity which is also subjected to an
unapportioned severance tax in a producing state, such as Oklahoma or
Texas, the Court's theoretical conclusions may even support denial of
such a tax.
It is assumed that most or perhaps all state severance taxes are
unapportioned92 to the extent they levy upon gross value at the point of
extraction without apportionment relative to any subsequent interstate
delivery. The sanction of that characteristic by the apportionment rule
of Commonwealth may well be a constitutional preference for an allo-
cation such as that hypothesized in the above quoted analysis con-
tained in Mobil. With those assumptions as a predicate, the range of
acceptable apportionment available to any nonproducing state's special
tax, such as the New York law, may be circumscribed. Any such result,
of course, also requires specific consideration of the form and effect of
the apportionment offered by the consuming state's law.
The New York oil company tax statute's apportionment formula,
based on the proportion of gross receipts from all operations of a verti-
cally integrated oil company in the State of New York to gross receipts
from all of its worldwide operations, is an apportionment formula es-
sentially equivalent to a single factor income, receipts, or sales
method.93 While having the virtue of simplicity, such a basis of appor-
states on an apportionment basis precludes taxation of all of the property by the state of the
domicile.").
91. See 453 U.S. at 617.
92. See Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927), for judicially imposed apportion-
ment. For examples of state severance taxes, see LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47:633(7) (West Supp.
1982); OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, §§ 1001-1024 (1981 & Supp. 1982); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 202.001-
.353 (Vernon 1982).
93. The New York statute's formula simply attributes taxable receipts to the state on the
basis of the taxpayer's gross receipts in the state in proportion to worldwide gross receipts. Its
effect is to place the total measure of sales revenue from interstate sales completed in New York
within the tax base, not unlike the "apportionment" under the Washington, D.C. tax at issue in
General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553 (1965). See N.Y. TAX LAW § 182(3)
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tionment has not gone without strong opposition.94 It can, however,
serve a nonproducing market state to more favorably weight a tax base
for imposition of a gross receipts tax.
The activities which are the object of taxation under the New York
law, by definition, virtually always include extraterritorial extractive
petroleum operations by a corporation which is also engaged in the
marketing of petroleum products in New York.95 The former activity
occurs on a relatively small scale in New York,96 in comparison to the
latter.97 The statute links the two activities as a precondition to tax
liability. The sales activity which touches the state is not a taxable
event unless the corporate taxpayer also engages in the other activities
which are part of a vertically integrated petroleum operation.
It would seem that the single factor formula apportionment utiliz-
ing gross receipts is particularly suspect in this context. The formula
applied is really only a horizontal apportionment of total corporate rev-
enue among an integrated oil company's market states. Beyond that
division, the formula gives no meaningful recognition to the relation of
the taxing state to the extractive activity occurring outside its borders.
Thus, the tax is essentially unapportioned insofar as the values in that
portion of worldwide receipts attributable to the state are concerned.
The value contained in the company's New York gross revenues which
is attributable to extraction is, by operation of the vertical integration
classification, carried entirely to New York for imposition of the two
percent tax. Thus, whenever local taxation of such extractive activity
also occurs in another state where the taxpayer produces the products
s6ld in the market state of New York, multiple taxation is arguably
present.
The application of a single factor method of apportionment based
upon a receipts or sales factor has been approved in both the income98
(McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); f. General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U.S. at 554
(describing the D.C. tax).
94. See General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U.S. at 557-62; Hellerstein, State
Tax Discrimination Against Out-of-Staters, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 113, 121-23 (1977).
95. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 182(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); sufpra notes 78-79 & 84 and
accompanying text.
96. Department of Energy statistics indicate crude oil production in the State of New York of
841,000 barrels in 1981, with total U.S. production of 3,128,624,000 in the same year. ENERGY
INFORMATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, PETROLEUM SUPPLY ANN. 1981, Table 9 (1982).
97. In 1981, consumption in the state of New York exceeded 120 million barrels of gasoline
and 164 million barrels of other refined products. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., supra note 96,
at 160-64; FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., HIGHWAY STATIsTIcs 1981, at 9.
98. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 269-71 (1978).
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and the gross receipts tax contexts. 9 The absence of other factors in
measuring the relationship of the taxing states to the tax bases in those
instances has been accepted in decisions made with a less than thor-
ough analysis. The results most often have been attributed to a liti-
gant's failure to prove the effect of such apportionment, or lack thereof.
The precedents nevertheless exist and their summary conclusions on
the adequacy of such apportionment loom as a large hurdle for any
challenge to the methods of apportionment. The so-called urban sever-
ance tax may, however, contain elements which make more insightful
review of its apportionment unavoidable. The same factors may also
serve as a basis for disapproval of the apportionment scheme of such a
law.
The Supreme Court decisions which have examined the applica-
tion of the commerce clause to gross receipts taxes on inshipments of
other states' production have generally allowed unapportioned imposi-
tion. These results have been reached by, in essence, considering the
taxed activity as more or less local, with the tax being imposed on
transactions which have occurred after the completion of interstate
commerce.
In one explanation of this approach, which considered it all but
indefensible, the treatment of such taxes as sales or use taxes was de-
scribed as being the means of pragmatic avoidance of determining a
proper and workable apportionment between the state of origination
and the state of delivery. 0° While the sales or use tax analogy and
treatment may have served to lessen burdensome judicial inquiry into
the sharing of gross receipts tax recoveries by the several states in-
volved in taxable transactions, that approach may no longer be as easy
to follow under the more realistic guidelines employed by the Court in
its recent decisions.
The Court's mandate, requiring the determination of the practical
effect of a tax on the gross receipts from interstate transactions by a
state of destination, should preclude a separation of the transaction
from the scope of the commerce clause in the same manner as Com-
monwealth ended such exclusion of severance and production taxes.
Any tax oni interstate transactions by the state of destination should
arguably now always include a reasonable attempt at apportionment,
99. General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 439 (1964); see Hellerstein, supra
note 94, at 122-23.
100. Hellerstein, supra note 94, at 122-23; Hellerstein, supra note 38, at 168.
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with due consideration being given to the range and effect of actual tax
burdens similarly measured on the same transactions.
To permit an unapportioned gross receipts tax by the consuming
state, on the premise that the incidence of the tax is purely local, would
likely avoid recognition of the Court's focal point of inquiry-the ac-
tual effect on the economics of interstate transactions. A congressional
subcommittee report alluded to these practicalities by noting the diffi-
culty in asserting that the taxation of the same person on the same
transaction by the same measure is accomplished by anything but the
same form of tax.10' It further suggested that the existing pattern of
gross receipts taxes on production provide some systematic allowance
of credit for sales taxes on the same transaction, indicating that eco-
nomic result in a given transaction should control more than notions of
distinct forms of taxation. 0 2
The landmark inshipments decision of McGoldrick v. Bentvind-
White CoalMining Co."' coincidentally involved application of a New
York gross receipts tax upon natural resources delivered from out-of-
state producing sources. In Berwind- White, the Court determined that
the tax was in the nature of a use tax upon local activity, applicable
after the completion of interstate commerce.l°4
The approach taken by the Court in McGoldrick, sustaining a
gross receipts tax at the destination of an interstate transaction, was
premised upon the assumption that the goods lost their character as
interstate commerce when they arrived in the state and thus the tax was
levied on an intrastate activity. This approach is similar to the Court's
reasoning in Heisler-that goods taxed in the producing state are not
protected by the commerce clause because they are separate from inter-
state commerce until they are committed to interstate commerce-
which has now been rejected.10 5
The Court's five to four decision in GeneralMotors Corp. v. Wash-
ington 10 6 probably stands as the most significant authority for the desti-
nation state's gross receipts taxation of interstate commerce. That
101. SUBCOMM. ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE OF THE HousE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 565, 89th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 1059 (1965).
102. Id. at 1057.
103. 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
104. Id. at 57-58.
105. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617 (1981); supra text accom.
panying notes 39-40.
106. 377 U.S. 436 (1964).
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decision has been criticized for its disregard of real economic effect in
that it obscured the form of taxation involved and summarily separated
the tax from protections of the commerce clause.107 The Court ruled in
General Motors that apportionment was more or less automatic be-
cause only receipts from sales destined for the taxing jurisdiction were
subject to the tax.108 As indicated, the decision has been analyzed as
sustaining the gross receipts tax by likening it to a consumer sales tax,
when in fact it was an unapportioned excise tax, not on separate trans-
actions, but on the privilege of operations by the taxpayer. Thus, in
disposing of the aura of multiple taxation presented by an unappor-
tioned gross receipts tax in the destination state, the Court made a per-
functory analysis of the question, stating that all sales activities which
were the subject 6f the tax occurred within the taxing jurisdiction. Sim-
ilar reasoning has been suggested concerning the apportionment
formula of the New York tax.1 9
Therefore, the judicial approach to avoiding the difficult task of
determining whether a fair apportionment exists in a gross receipts tax
has involved a rather superficial analysis and a narrowing of the in-
quiry to only the consideration of whether there is at least some sup-
portable relationship between the levy and the local activity in the
taxing state. The majority approval of gross receipts taxes on interstate
transactions at the point of ultimate sale has not involved significant
probing of economic substance at all levels of the taxable activity in-
volved as would be expected in challenges premised on constitutional
limits of critical powers of the states. The points to be studied seem
obvious. With prevention of undue burdening of interstate commerce
as the end to be achieved, the interplay of taxes at all levels of the same
taxable activity, and in at least all similar forms, should be more thor-
oughly examined.
Commonwealth pushed back the boundaries of local versus inter-
state activity set by Heisler concerning production. It is hard to con-
ceive of the Court now avoiding the practical examination it has
resolved to employ by treating a consuming state tax on gross revenues
flowing from interstate activity as a local sales tax. Presumably, in the
testing of such a gross receipts tax levied by the market state today,
both a different standard of review and result from earlier precedents
107. See Hellerstein, supra note 38, at 171-74.
108. 377 U.S. at 448.
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should occur. This result would be in contrast to Commonwealth,
which rejected the theory of the earlier restrictive approach in Heisler,
but still reached the same result in sustaining the challenged tax.
If a tax measured by the gross value at the point of destination in
an interstate transaction does actually have the practical effect of being
a levy coexistent with an unapportioned severance or production tax on
part of the same taxable activities, some recognition of multiple taxa-
tion seems to be compelled. Such a situation appears to include exactly
those dangers suggested by the dissent in General Motors, particularly
where a gross receipts tax is pointed at a very specific integration of
activities making up the taxable privilege. 110
Most importantly, if the Supreme Court is to disregard labels and
fictions in favor of the realistic approach which it says it wishes to take
in these cases, the Court's treatment of a tax exacted upon a specific
group of activities and privileges as being analogous to a sales or local
use tax may no longer be tenable.
In the specific context of New York's special two percent franchise
tax on integrated oil companies, the treatment of the tax as a sales tax
to expediently avoid more meaningful consideration of multiple taxa-
tion in resolving the commerce clause issues presented in Berwind-
White and General Motors would seem much less correct, or perhaps
impossible. This is because the New York law expressly prohibits in-
clusion of the tax in the sales price of affected products.III Where out-
of-state oil production is an essential incidence of taxability, and collec-
tion or recovery of a tax from the local market is forbidden, it cannot
be passed off as wholly reflective of purely local activity or transactions.
IV. RATIONALE OF UNAPPORTIONED SEVERANCE TAXES
It has been suggested in this Article that the special market state
tax on oil company gross revenue may violate the commerce clause
because of an unqualified statement of preference for allocation to a
single situs in the case of severance taxes. The Supreme Court affirmed
the Montana Supreme Court's holding that no apportionment of the
severance tax was necessary without apparent need for discussion of
110. Both Justices Brennan and Goldberg in their dissenting opinions filed in General Motors
disagreed with the majority's apportionment rationale. They asserted that the Washington gross
receipts tax was a form of multiple taxation and violated the standards required by the commerce
clause. 377 U.S. at 449-62; see also Hartman, supra note 85, at 1076-78 (discussing "multiple
burdens" test approach to gross receipts tax).
11. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 182(11) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983) (anti-passthrough provision).
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any policy rationale in Commonwealth." 2 It is appropriate, however,
to consider the existence of a rationale supporting a preference for the
producing state's tax, to the possible exclusion of a nonproducing
state's gross receipts tax on an integrated oil company's extraterritorial
extractive activity.
Analysts have noted that the practical, or less formal, approach to
commerce clause review should result in an apportionment prerequisite
for production taxes to the same extent as those imposed on other privi-
leges. '1 3 Similarly, it may be asserted that, notwithstanding Common-
wealth, consistency and fairness dictate a requirement of some
apportionment at the producing state severance tax level, in like man-
ner as other taxes affecting interstate commerce. It is possible, how-
ever, that even taking the fundamentals of consistency and fairness as
generally controlling, apportionment in the case of severance taxes sim-
ply may not necessitate or justify reliance upon approximation permit-
ted in the case of income taxes where the three factor formula is
designed merely to furnish a fair estimate. As mentioned, the conclud-
ing footnotes in Exxon demonstrate the present Court's recognition of
the distinction between severance taxes and income taxes and their re-
spective effects.' 1 4 Therefore, even if the exclusive apportionment con-
clusion of Commonwealth does not mean what it appears to, it must still
be recognized that for purposes of gross valuation taxation upon min-
eral extraction, that activity is literally and exclusively connected with
the situs state, even though interstate commerce may now be consid-
ered to begin with the extraction activity.
In this regard, there may be significance to the Court's statement
in Commonwealth that it was not suggesting that the Heisler decision,
was incorrectly decided.' Without further elaboration, the basis for
that conclusion cannot be known. But the statement is indicative of the
view that there remains a justification for an apportionment method
which more directly sets apart value at the point of the exclusively local
tax incidence, in the narrow frame of mineral production, as opposed
to any generalized apportionment appropriate in the case of a general
excise, broad-based privilege, or net income tax. A tax upon the privi-
112. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617 (1981).
113. See Hellerstein, supra note 38, at 174; Williams, Severance Taxes and Federalm: The
Role of the Supreme Court in Preserving a National Common Marketfor Energy Supplies, 53 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 281, 307-08 (1981).
114. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
115. 453 U.S. at 617 n.7.
19831
29
Miers: The Urban Severance Tax: Some Questions as to Apportionment
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1982
TULSA LAW JOURATAL
lege of extraction of minerals may not constitute a property tax; but its
incidence is the changing of the land from which the taxable produc-
tion is taken. This similarity was expressly recognized by the Court in
Commonwealth."16 The application of another state's gross receipts tax
to that activity, premised upon the existence of a unitary business, may
therefore not fall within the pattern established by Exxon with respect
to taxes on corporate net income.' 7
The Court has noted that attempts to achieve complete uniformity
in application of the apportionment rules may, in certain instances, re-
sult in greater difficulty than is remedied and that this difficulty may be
even greater where a long standing tax policy exists in one state." 8
This would be the case if severance taxes in producing states were sub-
jected to a constitutional challenge based upon interaction with a re-
cently adopted measure like the New York tax which seeks to levy
upon the same incident or privilege.
Perhaps the economic sectionalism, of which the form and scope
of the New York law appear to be a manifestation, itself provides the
appropriate rationale. A nonproducing state's oil privilege tax, which
includes almost exclusively extraterritorial production activity, is one
which necessarily goes largely without the political check which likely
serves best to proportion tax burdens. With a prohibition of any collec-
tion of the tax cost in prices charged in the consuming state, this impor-
tant relationship is even less existent and the melding of due process
standards with the need for fair apportionment becomes more obvious.
Absent the important balancing mechanism of constituent exposure to
the economic burden of a tax, closer scrutiny of its effect has been rec-
ognized as appropriate and necessary." 9 Where the local impact of
such a tax is exported, or at least purposely deflected to other states and
constituencies, the long standing suggestion of increased unfairness or
discriminatory application becomes more likely.
In the constitutional sense, such a restriction on the transferability
116. "In many respects, a severance tax is like a real property tax, which has never been
doubted as a legitimate means of raising revenue by the situs State (quite apart from the right of
that or any other State to tax income derived from the use of the property)." Id. at 624.
117. See supra text accompanying note 54.
118. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 277-80 (1978).
119. Barrett, "Substance" vs. "Form"in the Application of the Commerce Clause to State Taxa-
tion, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 740, 749-50 (1953); Hellerstein, State Taxation and the Supreme Court:
Toward a More Un/fedApproach to ConstitutionalAdjudication, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1426, 1448-50
(1975); Developments in the Law-FederalLimitations on State Taxation ofInterstate Business, 75
HARv. L. REv. 953, 957 (1962).
[Vol. 18:359
30
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 18 [1982], Iss. 3, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol18/iss3/1
"URB4N SEVER,4NCE TAX"
of the burdens of a gross receipts tax of a very particularized out-of-
state activity is a patent barrier which may be harmful to the nonpro-
ducing state as well as those states where the production takes place.
Economies of scale and accessibility to markets through established
modes of transport and distribution may be desirable in the capital in-
tensive production of energy. Big may not be all bad for the consumer.
The denial of the right of the market to absorb part or all of an inte-
grated producer's tax costs could reduce sources of supply if other
states allow the recovery of such costs. That aspect of an anti-
passthrough provision is a possible rationale for more specific appor-
tionment. That is, if the market state forbids cost recovery to the extent
of a significant charge against gross receipts, the relative importance of
its contribution to the corporate profit and viability is diminished.
It has been suggested that the post extraction mineral value be ap-
portioned in a manner paralleling value added tax provisions.1 20 While
this approach may not be the most appropriate in a federal system, the
Commonwealth and Exxon decisions, taken together, suggest some
more specific separation is a permissible and, perhaps, a required form
of apportionment for the type of narrowly framed taxation of the gross
revenue of the oil and gas producing activity which consuming states
may wish to impose. The states in which the production does occur
may have been perceived as able to impose a gross valuation tax on it
with greater appreciation of economic effect and with less potential for
multiple taxation and discriminatory application than a distant state
whose economic structure does not contribute directly to attracting and
supporting the front-end investment, risks, and productive activity re-
sulting in the taxable events.
The Court may also simply be of the view that valuation taxation
of the production of oil and gas or other natural resources is so intrinsi-
cally tied to situs that apportionment of value at the point of removal
from the ground should not be required. With that treatment granted,
there is much less room to realistically avoid the multiplicity which is
presented by another state's taxation of the same activity, particularly
when the initial production is now recognized as a part of interstate
commerce.
Notwithstanding all these considerations involved in the question
of apportionment of severance taxes and the decision in Common-
wealth, additional inquiry into that subject is warranted. Recognition
120. Williams, supra note 113, at 308.
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of the level of extractive activity involvement with out-of-state opera-
tions and markets is a likely subject for further judicial and even con-
gressional action.12 1  Producers engaged in integrated multistate
petroleum operations may ultimately find that some form of apportion-
ment of severance taxes, similar to other taxes levied upon a unitary
business, must be afforded in their situation to preclude discriminatory
multiple taxation. The so-called urban severance tax in New York is a
manifestation of sectionalism and protectionist tax policy.
It is submitted in this Article that the existing apportionment stan-
dard for producing situs severance taxes under Commonwealth may
make the New York type oil tax constitutionally deficient. But to the
extent that proposition is not sustainable, the practical consequences of
the energy tax conflict may make it economically imperative that the
integrated taxpayers subjected to gross receipts taxes at both produc-
tion and market sites reassert the theory 22 that the fundamental con-
cept of the commerce clause mandates that producing state production,
or severance, taxes be apportioned, particularly where the "local" inci-
dence of such taxation is no longer supportable.
In Commonwealth, the Court stated that severance taxes are not
distinguishable in economic effect from other taxes subjected to com-
merce clause scrutiny.' 3 If effective gross receipts taxation on mineral
severance is imposed on a unitary business by more than the situs state,
this lack of economic distinction may be of obvious significance to
challenges based upon the multiple taxation concept.
V. CONCLUSION
The critical point for consideration in the structure of a tax such as
the New York oil company tax is that gross receipts apportioned to
New York, as only a sales and distribution point, will reflect values
directly attributable to extractive rights and operations which have no
fair relationship to the state. This result occurs due to the predilected
imposition of the tax only upon an integrated taxpayer in a single in-
dustry where the initial productive activity is made a prerequisite to
121. See generally Browde & DuMars, Stale Taxation of Natural Resource Extraction and the
Commerce Clause: Federalismr Modem Frontier, 60 O- L. REv. 7, 45-56 (1981) (prediction of
future judicial and congressional direction); Hellerstein, Constitutional Constraints on State and
Local Taxation of Energy Resources, 31 NAT'L TAX J. 245 (1979) (discussing future resolutions of
controversies over constitutional limitations on state taxation of energy resources).
122. See Hellerstein, supra note 38, at 175.
123. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 616 (1981).
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taxability. The taxable activity of extraction occurs virtually entirely
outside the taxing state. Any gross value taxation effectively imposed
on that activity should be similarly limited in scope. The measure of a
tax as narrowly aimed as the New York tax is therefore inherently du-
plicative of a similar privilege tax imposed by a state offering govern-
mental support to the production. This bias in the formation of the tax
base suggests that otherwise reasonable income tax apportionment
methods may be ineffective in preventing multiple taxation and that a
method causing an integral flow of values to the taxing state is particu-
larly questionable.
Mineral production has an inherent relationship and impact on the
producing state by reason of the depletion of resources. A market state
which is served by the product can likely mount convincing arguments
that the consumption of those products is an economic exploitation
which justifies equal return through taxation of those engaged in the
activity. A balancing is obviously necessary. The Supreme Court's re-
cent treatment of the productive state's powers in this context indicates
a direction which dictates some adjustment of any special gross receipts
tax at the market level to avoid unfair multiplication.
Integrated oil companies subject to the federal crude oil windfall
profit tax which also engage in significant downstream operations in
nonproducing market states furnish an alternate method for bringing a
crude oil production tax base to consuming states. This is accom-
plished by a denial of a deduction for the federal windfall profit tax in
the computation of a corporate income or franchise tax imposed by the
consuming state.' 24 This approach to revenue raising by a nonproduc-
ing state is equivalent to a severance tax. Arguably, it involves much
more subtle questions of apportionment than the New York form of
levy on integrated oil companies discussed in this Article. However,
the denial of deductibility involving a special levy of the magnitude of
the windfall profit tax, a tax which impacts on an activity carried on
primarily in one section of the country, should probably also be ques-
tioned in terms of its real and practical effect on the adequacy of usual
apportionment methods.12 A fundamental practicality involved in
124. This has been accomplished by express statutory denial in the states of Iowa, Minnesota
and Wisconsin. IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.35 (West 1971); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.09(4)(f) (West
Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.04(3) (west Supp. 1982-1983). The states of Georgia, New
Jersey, New York, and South Carolina have taken the position in audit adjustments that their
existing corporate income tax statutes preclude the deductibility of the Crude Oil Windfall Profit
Tax for the reason that it constitutes a federal income tax.
125. Denial of a deduction for the windfall profit tax, particularly in the case of a statutory
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such treatment of the windfall profit tax is the enhancement of the tax
revenue position of a nonproducing state in an amount measured in
terms of crude oil production revenue.
If the sectional tax confrontation on domestic energy does exist,
the considerations outlined in this Article point to the conclusion that
any so-called urban severance tax, to the extent it is structured to be
effectively imposed extraterritorially by a nonproducing state, may well
involve conflict with implicit but fundamental meanings of the appor-
tionment standards enunciated by the Supreme Court in Exxon, Mo-
bil, and Commonwealth. This confrontation, and the obvious
involvement of the new standards with a specially designed oil com-
pany tax like New York's, would seem to provide a source for their
further refinement. The limitation of special gross receipts, rather than
net income, taxes aimed at reaching the value associated with extractive
activity in another state should be a subject as appropriate for the
Court's consideration as the question of tax exportation raised in Com-
monwealth. The result of such a question is difficult to predict, in view
of the experience of taxpayers challenging similar, if less aggressive,
taxes imposed upon the gross revenues from interstate transactions.
If any controversy involving the question is adjudicated, it is sug-
rule, will ostensibly be less susceptible to constitutional inquiry than the more direct levy in the
form of the New York tax. However, the magnitude of an adjustment to taxable income resulting
from such provisions or interpretations may conceivably raise apportionment questions which,
even if not of constitutional dimension, could provide the basis for a challenge. The situation
would arguably arise where a taxpayer's receipts within and outside the taxing state would not be
fairly reflected in real economic terms through application of the statutory formula of apportion-
ment. The windfall profit tax on many integrated companies, which concentrate in crude oil pro-
duction and refining, could have a particularly great impact on relative recoveries measured by
the sales factor in formula apportionment. To the extent deductibility is denied, the apportion-
ment of that income base is arguably distorted by the failure of the existing formulary treatment to
reflect the burden of the tax related to productive activity outside a nonproducing market state.
The propriety, or even necessity, of adjustment to such apportionment would seem to be called
into question in such circumstances.
There has been a judicial reluctance to provide apportionment factor relief in circumstances
where particular costs are geographically skewed. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267,
273 (1978); Commonwealth v. Lucky Stores, In., 217 Va. 121, -, 225 S.E.2d 870, 875-77 (1976).
Nevertheless, where a before profit excise of the magnitude of the federal windfall profit tax is
involved, recognition of special conditions warranting such relief is more supportable. If the
measure of the gross income of a corporate taxpayer is subjected to such an exaction at the pro-
duction level, capital recovery is extraordinarily affected in relative terms. Denial of recognition
of such a tax in computing taxable income raises the need to explore the adequacy of the income
apportionment to a state not providing the resource base generating the excise tax imposition.
The application of a normal three-factor formula in that situation may result in a distorted tax
base. The nonproducing state sales or receipts which become a part of the numerator in the usual
formula apportionment would arguably be overstated in relation to the producing state sales in
the denominator when the relative return to a taxpayer's operations subject to the windfall tax
burden is considered in real economic terms.
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gested that the purposes and policy of taxes upon the severance and
extraction of mineral resources should be explored in the same depth as
the constitutional requirements of the due process and commerce
clauses. The ends sought to be achieved by both state severance taxa-
tion and the relevant constitutional provisions should lead to a conclu-
sion that has perhaps already been perceived and implicitly recognized
by the Court in the decisions discussed in this Article. A determination
that a sharing of the added wealth relative to increased resource values
is not best accomplished by random gross revenue taxation of mineral
production by states not directly involved in that activity.
The better solution seems that the local market for the product
ultimately delivered from the activity is a more appropriate point for
any economic regulation or taxation of those increased values by a
nonproducing jurisdiction. Further, market state apportionment,
which provides more direct adjustment or credit for prior gross value or
revenue taxes of the state of extraction, would be more consistent with
economic consequence and the rationale of the commerce clause. To
take any other approach risks the very disruptive conflicts which that
provision of the Constitution is intended to prevent in the federal
system.*
* On March 29, 1983, while this Article was in the publication process, the Governor of
New York signed Ch. 18, 1983 N.Y. Laws -, which was passed by the legislature on the same
day. The new law retroactively repeals the anti-passthrough provision of the gross receipts tax on
oil companies. N.Y. TAx LAw § 182(11) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983);seesupra text accompany-
ing notes 5, 82, 88 & 11. It also repeals the provision requiring that the entire law shall be invalid
if any portion thereof is so found. Ch. 272, § 5, 1980 N.Y. Laws 433, 435-36. The tax is extended
through 1985, still as an imposition only upon vertically integrated oil companies. Under the new
law, the New York Tax Commission may decide to prescribe a method of allocation other than
the statutory formula in order to more fairly and equitably reflect the gross receipts of an oil
company from within the state.
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